On a view implicitly endorsed by many, a concept is epistemically better than another if and because it does a better job at ‘carving at the joints', or if the property corresponding to it is ‘more natural' than the one corresponding to another. This chapter offers an argument against this seemingly plausible thought, starting from three key observations about the way we use and evaluate concepts from en epistemic perspective: that we look for concepts that play a role in explanations (...) of things that cry out for explanation; that we evaluate not only ‘empirical' concepts, but also mathematical and perhaps moral concepts from an epistemic perspective; and that there is much more complexity to the concept/property relation than the natural thought seems to presuppose. These observations, it is argued, rule out giving a theory of conceptual evaluation that is a corollary of a metaphysical ranking of the relevant properties. -/- conceptual ethics, explanation, naturalness, epistemic value, concept/property, semantic internalism. (shrink)

Epistemic Utility Theory is often identified with the project of *axiology-first epistemology*—the project of vindicating norms of epistemic rationality purely in terms of epistemic value. One of the central goals of axiology-first epistemology is to provide a justification of the central norm of Bayesian epistemology, Probabilism. The first part of this paper presents a new challenge to axiology first epistemology: I argue that in order to justify Probabilism in purely axiological terms, proponents of axiology first epistemology need to justify a (...) claim about epistemic value—what I label ‘Downwards Propriety’—much stronger than any they have offered justification. The second part of this paper offers an argument that this challenge cannot be met: that there is no hope for providing a purely axiological justification of Downwards Propriety, at least given widely accepted assumptions about epistemic value. (shrink)

Les dernières décennies ont vu apparaître une nouvelle approche de l’histoire de la philosophie liée à la tradition analytique. L’auteur propose de montrer dans cette étude le lien entre la naissance de l’approche analytique de l’histoire de la philosophie et le travail réalisé par trois figures de l’histoire de la philosophie médiévale au XXème siècle : Kretzmann, Pinborg et Kenny. Malgré les nombreux travaux portant sur l’approche analytique, on continue à négliger le rôle joué par ces trois auteurs pour la (...) constitution de ladite approche. -/- . (shrink)

Many think that expressivists have a special problem with negation. I disagree. For if there is a problem with negation, I argue, it is a problem shared by those who accept some plausible claims about the nature of intentionality. Whether there is any special problem for expressivists turns, I will argue, on whether facts about what truth-conditions beliefs have can explain facts about basic inferential relations among those beliefs. And I will suggest that the answer to this last question is, (...) on most plausible attempts at solving the problem of intentionality, ‘no’. (shrink)

Epistemic rationality is typically taken to be immodest at least in this sense: a rational epistemic state should always take itself to be doing at least as well, epistemically and by its own light, than any alternative epistemic state. If epistemic states are probability functions and their alternatives are other probability functions defined over the same collection of proposition, we can capture the relevant sense of immodesty by claiming that epistemic utility functions are (strictly) proper. In this paper I examine (...) what happens if we allow for the alternatives to an epistemic state to include probability functions with different domains. I first prove an impossibility result: on minimal assumptions, I show that there is no way of vindicating strong immodesty principles to the effect that any probability function should take itself to be doing at least as well than any alternative probability function, regardless of its domain. I then consider alternative, weaker generalizations of the traditional immodesty principle and prove some characterization results for some classes of epistemic utility functions satisfying each of the relevant principles. (shrink)

Intellectual progress involves forming a more accurate picture of the world. But it also figuring out which concepts to use for theorizing about the world. Bayesian epistemology has had much to say about the former aspect of our cognitive lives, but little if at all about the latter. I outline a framework for formulating questions about conceptual change in a broadly Bayesian framework. By enriching the resources of Epistemic Utility Theory with a more expansive conception of epistemic value, I offer (...) a picture of our cognitive economy on which adopting new conceptual tools can sometimes be epistemically rational. (shrink)

Pérez Carballo adopts an epistemic utility theory picture of epistemic norms where epistemic utility functions measure the value of degrees of belief, and rationality consists in maximizing expected epistemic utility. Within this framework he seeks to show that we can make sense of the intuitive idea that some true beliefs—say true beliefs about botany—are more valuable than other true beliefs—say true beliefs about the precise number of plants in North Dakota. To do so, however, Pérez Carballo argues that (...) we must think of the value of epistemic states as consisting in more than simply accuracy. This sheds light on which questions it is most epistemically valuable to pursue. (shrink)

In 2001, W. Carnielli and Marcos considered a 3-valued logic in order to prove that the schema ϕ ∨ (ϕ → ψ) is not a theorem of da Costa’s logic Cω. In 2006, this logic was studied (and baptized) as G'3 by Osorio et al. as a tool to define semantics of logic programming. It is known that the truth-tables of G'3 have the same expressive power than the one of Łukasiewicz 3-valued logic as well as the one of Gödel (...) 3-valued logic G3. From this, the three logics coincide up-to language, taking into acccount that 1 is the only designated truth-value in these logics. -/- From the algebraic point of view, Canals-Frau and Figallo have studied the 3-valued modal implicative semilattices, where the modal operator is the well-known Moisil-Monteiro-Baaz Δ operator, and the supremum is definable from this. We prove that the subvariety obtained from this by adding a bottom element 0 is term-equivalent to the variety generated by the 3-valued algebra of G'3. The algebras of that variety are called G'3-algebras. From this result, we obtain the equations which axiomatize the variety of G'3-algebras. Moreover, we prove that this variety is semisimple, and the 3-element and the 2-element chains are the unique simple algebras of the variety. Finally an extension of G'3 to first-order languages is presented, with an algebraic semantics based on complete G'3-algebras. The corresponding soundness and completeness theorems are obtained. (shrink)

In line with recent efforts to empirically study the folk concept of weakness of will, we examine two issues in this paper: (1) How is weakness of will attribution [WWA] influenced by an agent’s violations of best judgment and/or resolution, and by the moral valence of the agent’s action? (2) Do any of these influences depend on the cognitive dispositions of the judging individual? We implemented a factorial 2x2x2 between–subjects design with judgment violation, resolution violation, and action valence as independent (...) variables, and measured participants’ cognitive dispositions using Frederick’s Cognitive Reflection Test [CRT]. We conclude that intuitive and reflective individuals have two different concepts of weakness of will. The study supports this claim by showing that: a) the WWA of intuitive subjects is influenced by the action’s (and probably also the commitment’s) moral valence, while the WWA of reflective subjects is not; b) judgment violation plays a small role in the WWA of intuitive subjects, while reflective subjects treat resolution violation as the only relevant trait. Data were collected among students at two different universities. All subjects (N=710) answered the CRT. A three-way ANOVA was first conducted on the whole sample and then on the intuitive and reflective groups separately. This study suggests that differences in cognitive dispositions can significantly impact the folk understanding of philosophical concepts, and thus suggests that analysis of folk concepts should take cognitive dispositions into account. (shrink)

The general aim of this article is to carry out a reconstruction of the theory of Population Dynamics (DP) in Ecology, according to Castle’s (2001) general stance with regard to the semantic view of theories, but doing it within the framework of metatheoretical structuralism. Thus, we will first identify Population Dynamics’ basic theory-element: its core K(DP) – with the class of potential models, the class of models (through the identification of its fundamental law) and the class of partial potential models (...) (though leaving aside the identification of its constraints and its intertheoretical links) –, and its domain of intended applications I(DP). Then, we will establish the general guiding lines of its theory-net, developing in some detail one of its main lines of specialization – namely, that related to the so-called “continuous growing” of the considered populations –, with DP’s principal “models”, and leave developing of the other of its main lines of specialization – namely, that related to the so-called “discrete growing” of the considered populations – for a further publication. (shrink)

It is not yet clear which response behavior requires self-regulatory effort in the moral dilemma task. Previous research has proposed that utilitarian responses require cognitive control, but subsequent studies have found inconsistencies with the empirical predictions of that hypothesis. In this paper we treat participants’ sensitivity to utilitarian gradients as a measure of performance. We confronted participants (N = 82) with a set of five dilemmas evoking a gradient of mean utilitarian responses in a 4-point scale and collected data on (...) heart rate variability and on utilitarian responses. We found positive correlations between tonic and phasic HRV and sensitivity to the utilitarian gradient in the high tonic group, but not in the low tonic group. Moreover, the low tonic group misplaced a scenario with a selfish incentive at the high end of the gradient. Results suggest that performance is represented by sensitivity correlated with HRV and accompanied with a reasonable placement of individual scenarios within the gradient. (shrink)

En el presente texto se defenderá la idea según la cual, la filosofía y el filosofar están intrínsecamente ligados. Se partirá de un caso paradigmático, el caso de la filosofía analítica. A partir de su definición,se pretenderá mostrar que las características más sobresalientes de dicha corriente están fundamentalmente ligadas al acto de filosofar.Por medio de dicho ejemplo, se desea mostrar que enseñar la filosofía consiste en enseñar a filosofar, y que por lo tanto una no puede ser separada de la (...) otra. Aprender a filosofar es entonces, aprender a ver un problema detrás de cada página de un texto filosófico, una argumentación detrás de cada problema y finalmente, una verdad detrás de cada argumentación. El precio a pagar por dicha separación es bastante alto, se podría hablar de épocas de decadencia intelectual. (shrink)

Qu’est-ce que la théologie analytique ? Que veut la théologie analytique et que pouvons-nous attendre d’elle ? Ces questions semblent constituer le défi d’aujourd’hui pour la théologie analytique. Nous répondrons à ces questions, en proposant de la distinguer des autres disciplines avec lesquelles elle semble se confondre. Cette recherche nous conduira d’abord à proposer une nouvelle définition de la théologie analytique fondée sur trois critères et par la suite à distinguer deux manières de faire la théologie analytique: (i) une théologie (...) analytique de bas en haut et (ii) une théologie analytique de haut en bas. Selon notre thèse, seule une théologie analytique confessante de haut en bas peut être considérée comme une théologie analytique à part entière. (shrink)

In this paper, I propose to analyse two objections raised by Turner Jr in his paper “On Two Reasons Christian Theologians Should Reject The Intermediate State” in order to show that the intermediate state is an incoherent theory. As we shall see, the two untoward consequences that he mentions do not imply a metaphysical or logical contradiction. Consequently, I shall defend an Intermediate State and I shall propose briefly one metaphysical conception of the human being able to reply to Turner (...) Jr’s objections. (shrink)

Y-a-t-il une inconsistance entre la thèse d’un Dieu chrétien et l’existence du mal ? Notre argumentation se basera sur l´excellente thèse développée par Alvin Plantinga, qui soutient, contre John L. Mackie, la consistance du théisme face au problème du mal. Cependant, nous refuserons de suivre la métaphysique modale adoptée par Alvin Plantinga et proposerons une position actualiste, et plus précisément l’essentialisme sérieux prôné par E. J. Lowe. Nous montrerons qu’il est alors possible de suivre l’argumentation logique de Plantinga tout en (...) soutenant un essentialisme sérieux. (shrink)

Altruism and solidarity are concepts that are closely related to organ donation for transplantation. On the one hand, they are typically used for encouraging people to donate. On the other hand, they also underpin the regulations in force in each country to different extents. They are often used indistinctly and equivocally, despite the different ethical implications of each concept. This paper aims to clarify to what extent we can speak of altruism and solidarity in the predominant models of organ donation. (...) It also raises the ethical question of whether these categories are adequate as a basis for such models, bearing in mind that organs are a scarce resource and that a shortage of them may mean that fewer lives are saved or improved. (shrink)

El presente artículo introduce el lector a la filosofía analítica de la religión desde un punto de vista histórico y haciendo énfasis en su evolución. El objetivo es doble: primero dar a conocer una nueva disciplina que se ha desarrollado de manera notoria dentro del habla inglesa pero que ha sido ignorada dentro de la filosofía de habla hispana; segundo, comprender su nacimiento y algunas de sus principales características.

Le titre de cette étude suggère de traiter trois termes, à premier vue, sans aucun lien. En effet, quel peut être le lien entre l’homosexualité et la Bible? Ou celui entre l’homosexualité et les sciences cognitives? Et finalement, quel lien peut-il y avoir entre ces trois termes à première vue juxtaposés? Il y a une réponse à chacune de ces trois questions et nous proposons d’explorer ces réponses dans le cadre de cette étude. Notre thèse consiste à défendre que les (...) sciences et plus précisément les sciences cognitives peuvent contribuer à la discussion sur l’homosexualité dans un cadre théologique (et/ou ecclésial). (shrink)

Dans cette étude nous nous proposons d’étudier la présence du Christ dans l’Eucharistie dans une perspective métaphysique et ontologique. Dans les deux premières sections nous définirons et montrerons qu’il faut distinguer: le problème de l’Eucharistie et la question fondamentale de l’Eucharistie. Nous défendrons la thèse selon laquelle le problème de l’Eucharistie en est vraiment un seulement pour ceux qui acceptent l’ontologie de l’aristotélisme, plus précisément celle de la transsubstantiation. Or, nous montrerons que l’ontologie de la transsubstantiation suppose des problèmes théoriques (...) insurmontables et nous suggérerons que nous devons nous intéresser plutôt à la question fondamentale de l’Eucharistie. Afin de montrer qu’il est possible de donner une réponse à la question fondamentale de l’Eucharistie, nous esquisserons une solution à partir d’une ontologie des tropes. (shrink)

Can we reify the form of a substance? Is it possible to identify DNA as the principle of our personal and numerical identity? These questions will be studied through Berti’s reading of Aristotle’s hylomorphism. Indeed, Enrico Berti proposes the identification of the DNA to the Aristotelian notion of form, thesis which raises many questions from an exegetical point of view and a metaphysical perspective. We will present the sources of Berti’s reading and one of the main objections made by Aristotle. (...) Thus, different versions of the Berti’s thesis will be examined and then, a thought experiment that makes them false. Finally, it will be proposed an aristotelian solution, coming from a contemporary Aristotelian (E. J. Lowe), that seems to prevent Berti’s mistakes and gives us a robust metaphysics of the identity. (shrink)

La metafísica después de ser ignorada por años ha regresado al centro de la escena en la filosofía contemporánea. Tomás de Aquino ha vivido una historia muy parecida, lo que dio nacimiento al tomismo analítico. A pesar de los trabajos desarrollados en esta línea de investigación, la metafísica del Aquinate ha sido fuertemente ignorada. Sin embargo, la metafísica de Tomás de Aquino tiene una ventaja, poco discutida entre los tomistas y tomasinos, y es la de ser una metafísica esencialista. Así, (...) en armonía con el trabajo del metafísico E. J. Lowe, quien presenta su metafísica como “esencialista seria”, se quiere mostrar que la metafísica del Aquinate tiene las mismas virtudes del “esencialismo serio”, lo que permite postularla como una posición válida y plausible para la metafísica contemporánea. (shrink)

This article aims to explore, through the civil society’s opinion, the polarisation between ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ and the group of the ‘new excluded’, or ‘new poor’, that has emerged as a result of the European economic crisis and the social transformations that followed in the Greek society. Based on the Theory of Justice introduced by John Rawls (1971), and using the approach of Critical Discourse Analysis, this study focuses on the discourse analysis of the perception of 97 representatives of local (...) and national NGOs, both formal and informal. The main results focus on different self and others’ presentations, especially during the economic crisis, and on the creation of an unbalanced, fragmented and exclusion-cantered society. However, the definition of rich and poor appears ambiguous through the analysis of various linguistic strategies of Greek NGOs revealing a hidden face of the society. (shrink)

In this paper, we propose to study the problem of universals in Thomas Aquinas with ‘’analytic glasses’’ (according to the famous phrase of Jonathan Barnes). Starting with the semantic criteria of Peirce used by Armstrong, we propose to present a new reading of the position of Thomas, especially of the De ente et essentia . We introduce the thesis of Thomas Aquinas in contemporary discussions highlighting the difficulty of classifying Thomas Aquinas as a realist or as a universalist. Our main (...) goal is thus to present a new reading of the position of Aquinas, while showing how and why his thesis might be a promising solution in the discussion of the problem of universals. (shrink)

En la actualidad hay un renacer del interés académico por la amistad que se aborda desde múltiples disciplinas, tales como la Sociología (Spencer & Pahl, 2006), la Psicología (Hojjat & Moyer, 2017), la educación (Kristjánsson, 2022), la Política (Digeser, 2016) o las Relaciones Internacionales (Koschut & Oelsner, 2014). En filosofía, la amistad es un tema clásico que se ha abordado con interés variable en distintos momentos de la historia: para griegos y romanos fue relevante a nivel personal y político (Aristóteles, (...) 1994); los pre-modernos la concibieron como un vínculo fundamental para la estabilidad política y la administración de la justicia (Smith & Devere, 2010) y en la Ilustración siguió considerándose un vínculo valioso. A partir del siglo XIX se oscurece su papel social (Laín Entralgo, 1986) y solo a finales del XX se retoma su valor en el ámbito social, más allá del personal (Derrida, 1998). A pesar de esa atención renovada a la amistad, las investigaciones desde la antropología filosófica o la metafísica son hoy menos frecuentes que otras como las que se hacen desde la ética o la filosofía política, por lo que es relevante prestarle atención desde esta perspectiva que es la elegida en este capítulo. El objetivo es repensar la amistad en Leonardo Polo desde su antropología trascendental partiendo de una confluencia interesante entre este filósofo y Agamben: la apertura ontológica al plano existencial (trascendental, en terminología poliana). Argumentaré cómo, en continuidad con la antropología trascendental y prosiguiendo el pensamiento de Polo, la amistad puede incluirse de alguna forma en el ámbito trascendental, puede ser un “amor personal” que, como tal, radica en la persona, muestra a la persona y la hace crecer. De acuerdo con eso, la estructura del capítulo es la siguiente: explicaremos la confluencia metafísica entre ambos filósofos y el papel de la amistad en la apertura al ámbito existencial (epígrafe 2); seguiremos con los elementos de la antropología trascendental que permiten proseguir pensando la amistad (epígrafe 3); estudiaremos el amar personal y la posibilidad de los “amores personales” (epígrafe 4) y finalmente abordaremos la amistad como amor personal. (shrink)

Replies to commentators Respuestas a los comentarios críticos de Carlos Patarroyo, Mirja Pérez de Calleja y Pablo Rychter.

Drawing on behavioral economics, nudges (policy interventions based on choice architecture) have the capacity to strategically shape policymaking, subtly guiding individual behavior by adjusting their decision environment. Applied to enhance vaccinations, boost retirement savings, or promote healthy habits, these interventions align with consensus-defined well-being. As governments adopt nudges, scholars have explored their role in fostering virtues. This paper argues that nudges have the potential to efficiently contribute to virtuous development by instilling and sustaining habits, respecting individual choice, and ensuring deliberation. (...) It introduces the concept of virtue nudges, emphasizing the alignment of habits with virtues for targeted behavioral change and the formation of morally virtuous habits. (shrink)

Are feelings an essential part or aspect of emotion? Cases of unconscious emotion suggest that this is not the case. However, it has been claimed that unconscious emotions are better understood as either (a) emotions that are phenomenally conscious but not reflectively conscious, or (b) dispositions to have emotions rather than emotions proper. Here, I argue that these ways of accounting for unconscious emotions are inadequate, and propose a view of emotions as non-phenomenal attitudes that regard their contents as relevant (...) to one's motivations. (shrink)

Teacher quality, its effect on students’ outcomes, and the association of these with economic growth, is the core of recent discussions in Latin America given the region’s weak results in international learning assessments. This paper investigates whether there is an effect of philosophy on the outcomes of critical reading for students in B.Ed. programs in Colombia. Relying on exact matching combined with propensity score matching with regression adjustment, we use national data from Colombia to show that students in B.Ed. in (...) philosophy outperformed students in other B.Ed. in critical reading test (0.401–0.124 SD), and, importantly, with higher effects observed for students with lower prior academic achievement (0.44 SD). This suggests that philosophy can help to narrow educational outcomes of students whose socioeconomic conditions are disadvantageous, contributing to social justice in education. (shrink)

El presente artículo tiene como objeto llevar a cabo un estudio pragmático y analítico sobre la acción de valoración, el valor y los valores a la luz de la ciencia semiótica y de la ciencia cibernética. Por ello, se desarrollará un proceso axiológico que ilustre cómo sucede el ingreso, la transición y la salida de códigos morales en función de un esquema cognitivo. Así pues, el proceso axiológico se postula, primero, en fundamento de tres sistemas: de mentalidad, de valores y (...) de biomoralidad y, segundo, conforme a la teoría de la información y de la teoría general de sistemas. (shrink)

Do moral beliefs motivate action? To answer this question, extant arguments have considered hypothetical cases of association (dissociation) between agents’ moral beliefs and actions. In this paper, I argue that this approach can be improved by studying people’s actual moral beliefs and actions using empirical research methods. I present three new studies showing that, when the stakes are high, associations between participants’ moral beliefs and actions are actually explained by co-occurring but independent moral emotions. These findings suggest that moral beliefs (...) themselves have little or no motivational force, supporting the Humean picture of moral motivation. (shrink)

The debate about the definition of Latinidad as a social identity has fluctuated between accounts that put it closer to ethnicity or closer to race. We present and defend the claim that the multiplicity of features and experiences of Latinxs in the United States is best accounted for by placing Latinidad in a different theoretical space. We draw from the ecological psychology and enactive literature on affordances to argue that Latinidad can be better understood as a social identity affordance: a (...) multifaceted landscape of possibilities for interaction, to do and to be done unto. We then focus on four areas that are part of the objective factors that have come to constitute Latinidad and which provide reasons to shy away from both race and ethnicity: the facts of mestizaje and hybridization, a vexed relation to the land, the political horizons and histories of this population, and the multiplicity of sensory-based cultural practices of Latinxs. It is precisely the many and deep variations across Latinxs that make social affordances an apt way to conceptualize a social identity whose reality is asserted pragmatically in many aspects of social life in the U.S. (shrink)

It is often claimed that fear has an important epistemological function in making us aware of danger. Reactive theories challenge this view. According to them, fear is a response to real or apparent danger. In other words, real or apparent danger is the reason for which we experience fear. Thus, fear depends on awareness of danger instead of making us aware of danger. Proponents of the reactive theory have appealed to phenomenological and, most prominently, linguistic observations to support their views. (...) In particular, they argue that how we talk about the objects of fear supports the view that fear is a response (rather than a perception), and that how we talk about reasons for fear supports the view that reasons for fear are necessarily evaluative (about danger). Building on systematic linguistic observations in the form of corpus analyses and survey data, we argue that how we talk about the objects of fear and how we talk about reasons for fear do not support the reactive theory. Indeed, these linguistic considerations undermine the reactive theory. Most importantly, they suggest that there are non-evaluative reasons for fear. This is good news for rival theories, like perceptual theories, which hold that emotions have epistemic value in contributing to knowledge of evaluative properties such as danger. (shrink)

This paper explores the relations between self-esteem and competition. Self-esteem is a very important good and competition is a widespread phenomenon. They are commonly linked, as people often seek self-esteem through success in competition. Although competition in fact generates valuable consequences and can to some extent foster self-esteem, empirical research suggests that competition has a strong tendency to undermine self-esteem. To be sure, competition is not the source of all problematic deficits in self-esteem, and it can arise for, or undercut (...) goods other than self-esteem. But the relation between competition and access to self-esteem is still significant, and it is worth asking how we might foster a desirable distribution of the latter in the face of difficulties created by the former. That is the question addressed in this paper. The approach I propose neither recommends self-denial nor the uncritical celebration of the rat race. It charts instead a solidaristic path to support the social conditions of the self-esteem of each individual. The paper proceeds as follows. I start, in section 2, by clarifying key concepts involved in the discussion. In section 3, I identify ten mechanisms that support individuals’ self-esteem and impose limits on competition. I focus, in particular, on the challenges faced by people in their practices of work. In section 4, I outline prudential and moral arguments to justify the use of the proposed mechanisms. Section 5 concludes with remarks on the role of social criticism in the processes of change implementing the mechanisms. (shrink)

What would happen if one morning you wake up clumsy, as if your sense of touch were unreliable, arbitrarily on and off? And what would this clumsiness look like if we could transfer it to the moral sense? The article expounds an interesting analogy between the sense of touch, loosely construed, and the moral sense: just as a sort of consistency is necessary for the sense of touch to do its job, so it is for the moral sense to play (...) its part. Touch enables us to navigate the everyday world of coffee pots and staircases; our moral sensibility comes into play when we act or when we judge our actions and those of others, and plays a directive role in what we feel, how we feel it, and how we react to it. Taking the analogy further, I will suggest that inconsistency causes, in both cases, a certain clumsiness, and that clumsiness is linked to arbitrariness – like the person that helps others in dire need, but only does so on some rainy days. (shrink)

The literary genesis of Einbahnstraße by Walter Benjamin represents a very special case of the use of the procedures of surrealism in the philosophical-literary production of the author. The process of evolution of thinking that ended up in the writing of this piece is unveiled throughout the present analysis. This is a sign of both waiver and restart; the opening for a new productive dimension in the career of one of the most important —and misunderstood— philosophers of the 20th century. (...) More than enlightening a small master piece of philosophy from a literary perspective, or analyzing a small master piece of literature from the philosophy, what is being problematized here is the division, cultivated or figured throughout the years, between both disciplines. This work is intended to recover what is insoluble from the philosophical-literary labor of Walter Benjamin, besides tracing a possible reconfiguration for an interdisciplinary field of work to come up and contribute in the understanding of the problem called The Retreat of Metaphor by Jacques Derrida. (shrink)

Laura Specker Sullivan (2022) makes a fairly compelling case for the value of the perspectives of Buddhist practitioners in neuroethics. In this study, Tibetan Buddhist monks have been asked, among other things, whether consciousness, in brain-injured patients in a minimally conscious state, entails a duty to preserve life. In our view, some of the participants’ responses could be used to inform the bioethical debate on death determination.

Substructural approaches to paradoxes have attracted much attention from the philosophical community in the last decade. In this paper we focus on two substructural logics, named ST and TS, along with two structural cousins, LP and K3. It is well known that LP and K3 are duals in the sense that an inference is valid in one logic just in case the contrapositive is valid in the other logic. As a consequence of this duality, theories based on either logic are (...) tightly connected since many of the arguments for and objections against one theory reappear in the other theory in dual form. The target of the paper is making explicit in exactly what way, if any, ST and TS are dual to one another. The connection will allow us to gain a more fine-grained understanding of these logics and of the theories based on them. In particular, we will obtain new insights on two questions concerning ST which are being intensively discussed in the current literature: whether ST preserves classical logic and whether it is LP in sheep’s clothing. Explaining in what way ST and TS are duals requires comparing these logics at a metainferential level. We provide to this end a uniform proof theory to decide on valid metainferences for each of the four logics. This proof procedure allows us to show in a very simple way how different properties of inferences (unsatisfiability, supersatisfiability and antivalidity) that behave in very different ways for each logic can be captured in terms of the validity of a metainference. (shrink)